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I. INTRODUCTION

The onset of the current financial crisis brought

with

it an

unprecedented

intervention in financial markets by the Federal Reserve and the United States Treasury.
Starting with the bailout of Bear Steams in early 2008, these governmental bodies and

* Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law, and S. Samuel Arsht Professor, University of
Pennsylvania Law School, respectively. We are grateful to Bob Allen, Rob Bliss, Patrick Bolton, Frank
Diebold, Dick Herring, Jonathan Lipson, David Skeie, and participants at the Northwestern Law faculty
workshop, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the "Preventing the Next Financial Crisis" Conference at
Columbia Business School, the Bankruptcy and Financial Distress Conference at the University of Paris
Nanterre, and the Penn Law faculty retreat for helpful comments; and to David Gunther for excellent research
assistance. Earlier versions of this Article were first drafted in November 2008 and posted on www.ssrn.com as
of March 1 8, 2009.
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their leaders were prominently involved in the negotiations and the ultimate resolution of
each major non-bank

financial institution that encountered financial distress. The

government arranged outcomes on an ad-hoc basis, with varying degrees of taxpayer
support. In the Bear Stearns case, taxpayer funds facilitated a merger. In the AIG case,
the Federal Reserve made a substantial direct loan to the company. With Lehman
Brothers, the government declined to offer any money, and the company ultimately filed
for Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy.
Although it was hard to distill a consistent policy rule from the government's rescue
efforts, one guiding principle was its preference to avoid all possible bankruptcy filings
because of the supposedly severe consequences that would follow. Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke acknowledged this policy in a rare public interview on 60

Minutes:
There were many people who said, "Let 'em fail." You know, "It's not a
problem. The markets will take care of it." And I think I knew better than that.
And Lehman proved that you cannot let a large internationally active firm fail
in the middle of a financial crisis. 1
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner echoed these sentiments in defending the
rescue loan to AIG:
We were caught between these terrible choices of letting Lehman fail-and you
saw the catastrophic damage that caused to the financial system----{)r coming in
and putting huge amounts of taxpayer dollars at risk, like we did at AIG, to
keep the thing going, unwind it slowly at less damage to the ultimate economy
and taxpayer.2
This point of view has become the conventional wisdom, which now points to the
Lehman bankruptcy as the singular, defining moment of the financial crisis. The
government's decision to allow Lehman to file for bankruptcy, instead of providing a
government rescue, was, in the standard account, the primary cause of the severe
economic and financial contraction that followed.3
Critics

emphasize

two

different

shortcomings

of

bankruptcy,

often

without

distinguishing between them. The first focuses on the effect of bankruptcy on the value of
the distressed firm itself. Bankruptcy, the reasoning goes, would severely dissipate the
value of the firm's assets. We will refer to this first set of concerns as the firm-specific

risks of a bankruptcy filing. The other rationale highlights the negative repercussions of a

I. Interview by Scott Pelley with Ben B ernanke, Federal Reserve Chainnan, on 60 Minutes (CBS
television broadcast Mar. 15, 2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03 / 12/60rninutes/
main4862 19 1 .shtml.
2. Interview by George Stephanopoulos with Timothy Geithner, United States Treasury Secretary, on
This Week with George Stephanopoulos (ABC television broadcast Mar. 30, 2009), available at
http://www .abcnews.go.com/ThisWeekistory?id=7200273&page=4 .
3. One example of the supposed causal link as reported in the media: "Lehman's collapse was a decisive
moment in the 13 -month-old credit crisis. The government's decision not to bail out the finn set off a near panic
among investors and lenders world-wide, forcing the U.S. to push through a historic rescue plan for the
financial system." Carrick Mollenkamp, Susanne Craig, Jeffrey McCracken & Jon Hilsenrath, The Two Faces
ofLehman's Fall-Private Talks ofRaising Capital Belied Firm's Public Optimism, WALL ST. 1., Oct. 6, 2008,
at A I .
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bankruptcy filing outside the firm. A bankruptcy filing directly affects the firm's
contractual

counterparties,

some

of

whom

(such

as

lenders

and

derivatives

counterparties) have direct claims on the firm, while others hold contracts whose value is
tied to the distressed firm.4 A bankruptcy filing also may have broader spillover effects,
such as a general effect on confidence. We will call these direct and indirect spillover
effects

systemic risks. 5 This Article will seek to explore the widespread perception that

firm-specific and systemic risks make bankruptcy untenable for financial institutions.
Our first goal is simply to assess the trade-offs between bankruptcy and the
discretionary, government-orchestrated rescue system that was used instead as the
financial system tottered, and which is reflected in the Obama administration's financial
reform proposals. The merits and demerits of the two approaches are too often simply
asserted without any serious comparison of the benefits and costs of the strategies. In this
Article, we will take a much closer look. Drawing on the tools of corporate finance and
applying them to key institutional features of bankruptcy, we will consider whether
bankruptcy can effectively resolve the financial distress of a large nonbank financial
institution. We then will subject the bailout alternative to a similarly careful stress test. 6
Our conclusion can be simply stated: we believe that allowing the bankruptcy
process to work is preferable to an ad-hoc approach of preventing bankruptcy with last
minute rescue efforts. The rescue loan approach favored in the financial crisis increased
uncertainty, increased the costs of moral hazard, and dampened the incentive of private
actors to resolve distress before a desperate "day of reckoning" arose. These forces
created substantial costs, over and above the direct and substantial cost to the taxpayer of
rescue funding. While there is also a downside to allowing distress to be resolved through
Chapter

1 1 , we believe the firm-specific risks of Chapter 1 1 are overstated, and are not

sufficient to justify recent policy. On the firm-specific dimension, the law gives
distressed firms several advantages in bankruptcy that are unavailable outside of
bankruptcy. These advantages help preserve firm value, allocate control rights to residual
claimants, and do a more effective job of handling moral hazard concerns than taxpayer-

4. If investor A sold protection on Lehman Brothers to another investor B in the credit default swap
market, for example, neither A nor B would hold a direct claim on Lehman, but both would be affected by
Lehman's bankruptcy filing (A would owe a payment to B). Credit default swaps are analyzed in detail in Frank
Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. ON. L. REv. 1019 (2007).
5. See, e.g. , Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 1 93 (2008) (outlining the nature and causes
of systemic risk). Some commentators define systemic risk more narrowly by including only direct effects,
treating crises of confidence as a separate phenomenon. See, e.g. , George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott,
What Is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It?, 7 lNDEP. REV. 37 1 (2003). We use
the broader definition, since both direct losses and confidence crises are potential third party effects of a default.
6. We confine our analysis in this Article to entities that can file for bankruptcy, which includes many
financial firms and the parent companies of subsidiaries that cannot themselves file. Although we compare
Chapter II to commercial bank-style resolution rules, see infra notes 1 16-22 and accompanying text, we do not
discuss using Chapter II to resolve distress in government-insured commercial banks and governmental units
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. We do so primarily because the underlying issues in these entities are
different: because of implicit or explicit government guarantees on the claims on these entities, taxpayers are
residual claimants, which creates an inherent value of government involvement in the resolution process. For
recent work that confirms that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is in effect the residual claimant in
most insured bank failures, see Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks are Not Allowed in
Bankruptcy (Dec. II, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.southbaylawfirm. comlblog/
uploadlfdic-receiverships-why-banks-are-not-in-bankruptcy.pdf).
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funded rescue loans o n the eve of bankruptcy.
Concerns about the systemic consequences of financial distress, by contrast, are a
more serious, and more viable, objection to Chapter

1 1 . Some of these systemic costs,

however, would arise in any procedure that forces counterparties to bear losses when
there are not enough assets to satisfy all counterparty claims. The costs could perhaps be
reduced through the use of a "prompt corrective action" regime designed to shut down
institutions before they become truly insolvent, as with commercial banks. But this
approach brings important costs of its own, and it does not eliminate systemic risk. 7
More importantly, recent examples suggest that bank regulators often are unable or
unwilling to identify distressed institutions and trigger a resolution procedure before the
institution becomes deeply insolvent. As a result, prompt resolution can only be
guaranteed with the promise of taxpayer assistance behind it. The distress of financial
firms thus poses an inescapable choice: regulators must either allow counterparties to
take losses, and thus confront the possibility of systemic effects, or they must use
taxpayer money to prevent the losses from being realized.8 Bankruptcy has proven to be
an adequate mechanism for handling the former choice, and it is flexible enough to
accommodate the latter.
The general "crisis of confidence" effects that follow from the bankruptcy filing of a
major financial institution that is greatly interconnected with the financial system (like
Lehman Brothers or AIG) cannot be discounted entirely, even if they flow purely from a
self-fulfilling prophecy rather than from fundamentals. It is entirely possible, for instance,
that Lehman's bankruptcy had severe effects on the financial system simply because
people believed that it would. Yet there is reason to believe that any blame for the effects
of the Lehman crisis should not be laid on the doorstep of the bankruptcy laws. Other
major events took place during the same time period: for example, the distressed
acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America occurred the same weekend, and the
announcement of the AIG rescue followed several days later. As we shall see, the AIG
rescue announcement produced immediate negative reactions that were as severe as the
reaction to Lehman.9 This suggests that the "Lehman effect" on the markets stemmed
from the news that two major investment banks were financially distressed, rather than
from the news that Lehman had filed for bankruptcy to resolve its distress. It is far from
obvious that a rescue loan to Lehman would have prevented the general disruption and
crisis of confidence in financial markets that followed.
Given the inherent challenges that these issues present to policymakers, we do not
mean to suggest that government should not intervene in financial markets generally. In
particular, we do not address the efficacy of the numerous broad-based infusions of

7. The collapse of IndyMac Bank and the botched resolution of Wachovia's struggles, both in 2008,
illustrate some of the limitations of prompt corrective action. See infra note 121.
8. Some systemic risks may be exacerbated by the bankruptcy process itself. We discuss this possibility
infra in Part VII, which explores the effects of the special treatment given to derivatives and other financial
contexts in bankruptcy.
9. Lehman filed for Chapter II bankruptcy on September 1 5 , 2008. Merrill Lynch agreed to be acquired
by Bank of America the day before, and the AIG rescue loan was announced two days later. These events have
been chronicled in numerous books and articles about the crisis. See, e.g. , ANDREW RosS SORKIN, Too BIG TO
FAIL: How W AL L STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM-AND THEMSELVES
(20 1 0).
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capital into financial markets, some of which seem to have had stabilizing effects. IO
Nevertheless, we hope that this Article will provide a useful framework for understanding
the complicated issues involved in the interaction among financial firms, systemic risk,
and Chapter

1 1 . We also hope to challenge the common view that Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy

is an inappropriate vehicle for resolving distress in financial firms. In particular, the
common phrases used to describe Chapter
"failing,"

1 1 filings in these circumstances (such as

"collapsing," or "going under") provide a very misleading view of the

bankruptcy process and its actual consequences, compared to the taxpayer-funded non
bankruptcy alternative.
Although we still cannot be certain that the recent wave of financial institution
failures is over, attention has now shifted to regulatory reform. Congress has been
debating financial reforms that would give bank regulators new powers to resolve the
financial

distress

of

the largest nonbank financial institutions-those deemed
"systemically important." II Although expanded powers could counteract a few of the
perverse effects of the recent rescue loans, they also would effectively institutionalize the
bailout strategy that was used throughout the onset of the financial crisis.
We begin by describing the principal problems created by financial distress-debt
overhang and creditor runs-and the mechanisms bankruptcy provides for addressing
these problems in Parts II and III respectively. In Part IV, we look to Drexel Burnham's
bankruptcy in

1 990 and Lehman's more recent filing for further lessons about the

efficacy of bankruptcy. In Part V, we tum to firm-specific bailouts, describing this
strategy's benefits and the distortions it causes. We then shift our focus back to
bankruptcy, considering the (legitimate) concern that it may not adequately counteract
systemic risk in Part VI, and exploring its treatment of derivatives, one of the chief new
habitats of systemic risk, in Part VII. In Part VIII, we consider the new financial reform
proposals, which would give bank regulators new authority to resolve the financial
distress of systemically important financial institutions. We argue that the proposed
resolution authority would institutionalize the use of bailouts as the strategy of choice and
should be rejected for this reason. Part IX is a brief conclusion.
II. THEORIES OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS: FIRM-SPECIFIC COSTS
Any discussion of distress resolution ultimately requires an analysis of the causes
and consequences of financial distress, and the means of resolving it. Although there is
no universally accepted definition, we characterize a firm as

financially distressed if it

possesses investment opportunities that are valuable to its investors if these opportunities

1 0 . We thus do not focus directly on the interventions of the Federal Reserve in the commercial paper and
other markets. For a brief summary of the Fed's interventions, see CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, APRIL
OVERSIGHT REpORT: ASSESSING TREASURY' S STRATEGY: SIX MONTHS OF TARP 25-26 (Apr. 7, 2009),
available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-040709-report.pdf (outlining the Fed's "unprecedented set of
steps to stabilize the financial system").
I I . The reforms were initially outlined in a White Paper released in July 2009. U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION (June 17, 2009), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinaIReport_web.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY WHITE PAPER]. As of
late 2009, the basic framework was included in legislation passed by the House. Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4 1 73, I I I th Congo (I st Sess. 2009) [hereinafter Frank Bil!J.
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are undertaken (or continued) , 1 2 but for which the firm is not able to obtain financing.
The term

investment opportunities should be interpreted broadly. In a commercial b ank,

for example, these opportunities are the origination and funding of loans to businesses
and individuals. In an investment bank, these opportunities include the provision of
advisory services for mergers and acquisitions, raising capital on behalf of its clients in
exchange for fees, and the management of trading p ortfolios.
This description of financial distress suggests a natural question: why would any
entity ever face costs of financial distress? In other words, if an investment is expected to
generate value for investors, why wouldn't some investor step in to fund it? Economists
have proposed many explanations, but we focus on two that we believe are most relevant
to the issues at hand.

A. Debt Overhang
When a firm is highly leveraged (that is, its debt-to-equity ratio is high), it may be

forced to forego profitable inve stments because of debt overhang. 1 3 The idea is as
follows: suppose a firm on the verge of default tries to fund itself by issuing new equity
(we consider equity for simplicity, but the argument works with any low priority security
like unsecured debt) . Equity holders are aware, of course, that their interest is last in
priority: in a default, they get paid only if debt holders are paid in full. If the firm's
prospect of default is sufficiently high, new investors may refuse to contribute new
equity. These investors know that, while the firm's proj ects may be valuable, they will
not see any of that value. Instead, the cash flows made possible by their investment will
merely enhance the recovery of debt holders in the event that a default occurs. 1 4

B. Creditor Runs
Financial firms typically have a very particular capital structure: they borrow money
on a short-term basis, while their assets have longer maturity and are less liquid. 1 5 A
classic example of this is a commercial bank. Much of a bank ' s funding comes from
consumer deposits, which can be withdrawn from the bank at any time . Its assets, by

1 2 . To use finance tenninology, the finn has investments that have positive net present value (NPV).
Finance scholars distinguish financial distress from economic distress, in which a finn has only negative-NPV
projects. See, e.g. , Michelle 1. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter J J Reorganizations
and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings, 1 0 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 2 68 ( 1 994) (explaining the difference between
finns that should and should not liquidate). One goal of bankruptcy law is to separate out the financially
distressed finns from the economically distressed ones, allowing those with financial distress to continue in
business, and liquidating the economically distressed ones.
1 3 . The concept of debt overhang was first fonnalized in Stewart C. Myers, The Determinants of
Corporate Borrowing, S 1. FIN. ECON. 1 4 7 ( 1 977 ).
14. A related theory is the adverse selection ("lemons") problem. Like debt overhang, it predicts that
investments may be foregone when they must be funded with low-priority securities like equity. The finn 's
decision to issue equity to outsiders signals to the market that the stock must be overvalued, so the stock price
falls. George A. Ackerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J.
ECON.

488, 492-94 ( 1 97 0).

This observation and the implications discussed in the next two paragraphs are generally associated
with the seminal work of Diamond and Dybvig. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs,
Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 9 1 1. POL. ECON. 40 1 ( 1 983) (analyzing the relationship between liquidity,
bank runs, and efforts to prevent future bank runs).
IS.
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contrast, are loans to homeowners, businesses, and entrepreneurs, which may have
maturities of many years and are difficult to quickly convert into cash. As we have seen
in the current crisis, investment banks (which are funded heavily by short-term "repo"
loans) 1 6 and money market funds also fit this pattern. 1 7
This "maturity mismatch" b etween assets and liabilities can be perfectly functional
in normal times . B anks will hold short-term assets in proportion to the amounts they
expect depositors to withdraw, but they will not hold enough short-term assets to satisfy
all depositors at once if everyone withdraws. By limiting their short-term assets to
amounts needed to meet expected withdrawals, banks free up the rest for more
productive , higher-return uses.
The danger of this type of capital structure is that it can be susceptible to bank runs.
All depositors are aware that if other depositors choose to withdraw, the bank will need to
liquidate long-term assets, perhaps at steep losses, to sati sfy depositor withdrawals. If
these liquidation losses are steep enough, the bank will be insolvent and depositors will
suffer losses themselves i f they do not withdraw their money quickly enough. Bank runs
can be triggered, on one hand, by a fear about the quality of the bank's assets: if too many
of the bank ' s loans have gone bad, the bank will not have enough assets to cover all
deposits, causing depositors to run. They can also be triggered by panic : even i f the bank
funds valuable loans and is solvent when depositors do not run, the bank will be insolvent
when depositors do run because of losses from premature liquidation of assets. Thus, the
fear of a run can provoke the run itself. 1 8
AIG 's

securities

lending operation is

a prominent examp le o f this common

phenomenon outside the normal banking context. AIG held a large portfolio of securities
that it would lend out in exchange for cash collateral . 1 9 Similar to deposits in commercial
banks, these lending transactions were short-term in nature. To improve its returns , AIG
took the cash collateral it received and invested it in risky, illiquid securities such as
subprime mortgage bonds. 20 When the value of these bonds deteriorated, AIG's
counterparties increasingly demanded a return of their cash collateral . This forced AIG to
liquidate their illiquid securities at distressed prices, which further exacerbated their
losses. 2 1

1 6 . In a repo--or repurchase-loan, the financial institution borrower sells a security or other asset to the
lender and agrees to buy it back at a higher price on a later date. The difference in prices is the equivalent of
paying interest on a loan. For a discussion of these markets and the perverse feedback loop they can generate in
a crisis, see Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08, 2 3 1. ECON.
PERSP. 77 , 9 1 -98 (2009).
1 7. ld. at 90.
1 8 . With commercial banks, the risk of runs is reduced by deposit insurance, which guarantees that

customers will not lose their deposits up to a specified ceiling. But the investors in other firms do not have the
same protection. See, e.g. , id. at 96 (discussing the vulnerability of investment banks like Lehman and insurers
like AIG).
1 9 . Serena Ng & Liam Plevin, An AIG Un it's Quest to Juice Profit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at CI.
20. ld.
2 1 . !d. For an account of AIG's squabbles with Goldman Sachs over the amounts of collateral AIG needed
to post, see Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Testy Conflict with Goldman Helped Push A .I. G. to the Edge,
NY. TIMES, Feb. 7, 20 1 0, at A I .
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III. B ANKRUPTCY L AW AND F IRM- S PECIFIC S OLUTIONS TO F INANCIAL D ISTRESS

U. S. bankruptcy law provides several important features that are designed to cure
the debt overhang and panic run problems that cause financial distress. The first is
debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing. Bankruptcy ' s DIP financing rules allow firms to
issue senior, secured claims that take priority over other creditors. 22 It is well understood
in the corporate finance literature that senior securities are an effective cure for the debt
overhang problem,

because

the new lender

is

less

likely to be subsidizing old
23
claimholders with the new loan if the lender has priority.
A pri ority lender will receive
more of the return from its new investment and thus will be more willing to lend. While

new, secured loans are sometimes available outside of bankruptcy, in other cases they
may not be possible. Most bond indentures, for example, contain negative pledge clauses
that limit or prevent the incurrence of new, senior debt. Bankruptcy, in contrast, renders
these clauses ineffective. 24
A second feature that relates to curing debt overhang is the ability to sell assets free

and clear of liens and other liabilities. 25 A firm whose liabilities exceed its assets is less
likely than a healthy firm to be acquired, because the acquiror could be assuming a net
liability. Although an acquirer can circumvent this problem by buying only the distressed
firm's assets, there is always a risk that the acquirer will be held responsible for some of
the liabilities it sought to avoid. In bankruptcy, the acquirer can purchase the assets free
and clear of any claims, with the proceeds from the sale distributed to creditors through
the reorganization plan. 2 6 In recent history, this has been the most common outcome in
large Chapter

1 1 s. A recent empirical study co-authored by one of this Article's authors

finds, for instance, that roughly two-thirds of all large bankruptcy outcomes involve a
sale of the firm, rather than a traditional negotiated reorganization in which debt is
converted to equity through the reorganization plan. 27

22 . 1 1 U.S.c . § 364 (2006). The role of DIP financing as a solution to debt overhang is explored in
George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession FinanCing, 46 VAND. L. REv. 90 1
( 1 993), and its historical antecedents in David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in
Possession FinanCing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 905 (2004).
23. See, e.g. , Triantis, supra note 22, at 9 1 9 (stating that the "ability to issue senior or secured debt can
mitigate the incentive to underinvest in profitable projects").
24. 1 1 U. S.c. § 5 4 1 (c)( I )(B). The Fed's original $85 billion loan to AIG resembled a DIP loan in some
respects: it was a senior loan secured by all free assets of AIG, which is common in DIP lending. See, e.g.,
William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH . & LEE L. REv. 943, 967 (2009) (describing AIG's
guarantee and pledge agreement). The amount was, of course, unprecedented. But if AIG had filed for Chapter
1 1, it would not have needed this much, as it would not have had to pay its creditors in full . As we will discuss
later, the terms of the AIG loan were subsequently revised to be more favorable to AIG and include more junior
securities. See infra notes 79-8 5 and accompanying text.
25. 1 1 U.S.C. § 363 (authorizing bankruptcy sales).
26. Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 69, 97 (2004)
(discussing how free and clear sales are a major attraction of bankruptcy).
27. Kenneth Ayotte & Edward Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11 (Columbia Univ.
Ctr. For Law and Econ., Research Paper No. 32 1 , Northwestern Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 08- 1 6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=108 1 66 1 . The recent Chrysler and GM
bankruptcies were structured as sales-albeit unorthodox ones. See, e.g., Zach Lowe, GM and Chrysler: The
End of Bankl1lptcy as We Know It?, LAW.COM, July 9, 2009, http://www. Jaw.com/jsp/law/Article.jsp?id=
1 202432107397 (last visited Feb. 1 9, 2010).
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A third feature that deals with the "panic run" problem is bankruptcy's automatic
2
stay. 8 Banking literature suggests that suspending convertibility (prohibiting depositor
withdrawals so that the bank need not liquidate long-tenn assets) is perhaps the most
effective response to a panic run. 29 The automatic stay serves the same function in
bankruptcy: it effectively places a shield around the finn 's assets, and ceases creditor
collection efforts. 3 0 This can provide the finn with the breathing space it needs to
conduct its business in an orderly fashion, preventing a desperate scramble to satisfy the
claims of withdrawing creditors. The breathing space can be valuable not only if the finn
plans to remain as a going concern, but also if it plans to liquidate its assets but needs
time to do so. 3 1
The widespread belief that bankruptcy is not a p lausible response for a troubled
financial institution is only compelling if the mechanisms just described are not likely to
prove

effective.

However,

brief case studies of the two

largest inve stment bank

bankruptcy filings will show that under the right circumstances, bankruptcy is capable of
assisting distre ssed financial finns.
IV. FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BANKRUPTCY: DREXEL AND LEHMAN

Lehman was not the first maj or investment bank to file for bankruptcy. Two decades
ago, Drexel Burnham did the same thing after rising to prominence based on its
preeminence in the market for high-yield debt. We begin this Part by recounting Drexel ' s
trip through Chapter 11. W e then return to Lehman. Our analysis suggests that the
conventional wisdom-which points to Lehman as irrefutable evidence that bankruptcy
does not work in these cases-is mistaken.

A. The Drexel Burnham Bankruptcy
A mediocre bank when Michael Milken arrived in the early 1970s, Drexel rose on
the wings of the junk bond franchise Milken created, first through investments in "fallen
angels" and other junk bonds, and then by issuing junk bonds as a fonn of takeover
financing. 3 2 After earning enonnous profits in the 1980s takeover boom, Drexel was
hobbled at the end of the decade by Milken 's indictment for securities violations, the
bank ' s own $650 million securities fraud settlement, and the collapse of the junk bond
market. 33 In early 1990, Drexel desperately needed short tenn financing to remain afloat.
Unable to roll over $250 million in commercial debt, Drexel negotiated for a loan from a

28. 1 1 U.S.c. § 362(a).
29. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 1 5 , at 4 1 0 .
3 0. 1 1 U.S.c. § 362(a) (stating that the bankruptcy stay halts, among other things, the "commencement or
continuation" of litigation and any act to take possession or control over any property of the debtor's estate).
3 1 . Unlike most obligations, derivatives and other financial contracts are not subject to the automatic stay.
See, e.g. , I I U.S.C. § 362(b)(6) (exempting commodity contracts, forward contracts, and securities contracts
from the stay); § 362(b)(7) (exempting repos); § 362(b)( 1 7) (exempting swaps); § 362(b)(27) (exempting
master netting agreements). We discuss the reasons for and implications of this special treatment in detail in
Part VII, infra.
32 . In our opinion, the most entertaining account of Drexel's rise, and still one of the best, is CONNIE
BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' B ALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF DREXEL BURNHAM AND THE RISE OF THE JUNK BOND

(1989).
33. See, e.g., id. at 360 (detailing Milken's indictment); 369 (describing the $650 million settlement).
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group of banks led by Citibank and explored possible sales to foreign buyers, while the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Federal Reserve closely monitored its

travails. 3 4 The regulators ' principal concern was the stability of the financial markets and
the banking system. Once they concluded that neither would be jeopardized by a Drexel
bankruptcy, "the o fficials saw no reason to launch any heroic efforts to keep the company
alive" when Drexel ' s prospects for a loan or sale fell through. 3 5 On February 13, 1990,
Drexe l ' s holding company filed for Chapter 11. 3 6 "In allowing the fall," the

Wall Street

Journal wrote, "the government backed away from a policy that has guided regulation
,,
since the New Deal: that some financial institutions are j ust too big to fail. 3 7

Drexel ' s difficulties with the government did not end with its bankruptcy filing.
Drexe l ' s single largest creditor was the Justice Department. Drexel owed the Justice
Department $650 million under its securities fraud settlement, and government regulators
were actively involved in the case. The SEC asked to be included on the creditors'
committee, an unprecedented request given that the committee ordinarily consists o f

private individuals and institutions . 3 8 Savings and loan (S&L) regulators also thrust
themselves into the case, claiming that Drexel owed $6.8 billion to compensate S&Ls

that regulators took over for the losses they suffered from Drexel-related investments. 3 9
The most obvious effect of this intense government involvement was to limit Drexel's
options

for reorganization.

Bank regulators insisted that Drexel

not re-enter the

investment banking business in anything like its former capacity. 40
The patina of fraud surrounding Drexel, and the government's stance in response,
distinguishes its travails from financially distressed banks like Bear Steams or Lehman
Brothers that did not have quite the same reputation for misbehavior. But the general
traj ectory of the case is revealing nonethe less. Drexel itself was a harbinger of current
investment banks. Its business was much more similar to today's investment banks-and
its bankruptcy is thus more relevant-than many of its late 1980s peers would have been.
F or much of the 19th and 20th centuries, investment banks pro fited from their
superior knowledge about the value of the companies whose stock and debt the banks

underwrote. 4 1 When J.P. Morgan, the preeminent bank of the era, agreed to sell a
company's stock or bonds, the bank was in essence certifying that its partners had
concluded, based on their tacit knowledge of the market, that the company was high

34. See, e.g. , Michael Siconolfi et a!., Embattled Drexel Puts Itself up for Sale-Financial Vise Tightens
as Firm Asksfor Loans, WA LL ST. J., Feb. 1 3 , 1990, at C l .
3 5 . Alan Murray & Kevin G. Salwen, The End of Drexel: Fed, SEC Officials Decided Hands-Off Policy
Was Best, WALL ST. 1., Feb. 14, 1 990, at A6.
36. Id.
37. !d.
3 8. II U.s.c. § 1 1 02(a)--(b) (2006) instructs the U.S. Trustee to select a committee from the seven largest
creditors who are willing to serve. The provision does not distinguish private and governmental creditors, so the
SEC was not speaking out of school when it asked to be included.
39. See, e.g. , Paulette Thomas & Wade Lambert, S&L Regulators are Seeking $6.8 Billion in Drexel
Burnham Bankruptcy Case, WA LL ST. 1., Nov. 15, 1 990, at A4.
40. See, e.g., George Anders, A Shadow of Itself, Drexel Comes Backfrom Bankruptcy, WA LL ST. 1., Apr.
3 0, 1 992, at C I (noting that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. squelched the reorganized entity's plans to
provide advisory and underwriting services).
41 . The discussion in this paragraph draws on ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM 1. WILHELM, JR.,
INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW (2007).
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quality. But technological advances had made it easier to value companies by the 1960s,
eroding the value of the soft information that had been investment banks' key asset. 4 2 By
the 1970s and 19 80s, investment banks' emphasis on traditional advisory services had
diminished considerably, and their reliance

on proprietary trading operations

had

increased. 43 Drexel stood squarely in the middle of this transition. Drexel profited
handsomely from the advisory services it provided in connection with takeovers. But it
also held an extensive portfolio of securities for itself, and traded actively for its own
account. 44 As a result, Drexel had substantial assets when it filed for bankruptcy.
Drexel ' s efforts to maximize the value of its assets proceeded in three general step s.
First was the bank ' s human capital. Even before Drexel filed for bankruptcy, it began
trying to sell some of its trading operations. Given the likelihood that "strategic personnel
[would quickly] flee a sinking Drexel," as a media account put it, Drexel was particularly
anxious to sell its "big equity trading and research operation," which the department ' s
head

touted a s

"an

equity

department

for hire,

with

instant

credibility,

instant

distribution." 45 These e fforts to profit from Drexel 's human capital before it walked out

the door met with only limited success, largely because competitors knew they could
simply hire many of the employees directly, without giving a cut to Drexel . 46 Second,
Drexel moved to sell the most liquid securities in its portfolio as quickly as possible, in
part to provide funding for the bankruptcy process and in part to

assuage the

government ' s concerns that Drexel ' s predicament would interfere with the market for
government bonds. 47 Within a week, the bank had sold 82% of its securities, leaving
mostly low quality, hard to value j unk bonds in its portfolio . 48 Third, with the remainder
of its assets-which included illiquid j unk bonds and tangible assets-Drexel moved
much more slowly. Four months after the filing, Drexel held a liquidation sale that
featured the "desks, computers, kitchen equipment and even [the] brass coat racks" in its
New York City headquarters. 49 It held onto its most hard to value junk bonds even
longer, leaving much of the portfolio for the entity that later emerged from Drexe l ' s
reorganization. 50

42. ld. at 279 (describing the effect of computers).
43. The shift to proprietary operations, which require that banks have much more capital, is the principal
reason that nearly every major investment bank shifted to the corporate form and raised money through an IPO.
Id. at 278 -80 (noting that by 1 987 the only holdouts were Goldman Sachs and Lazard Freres, which finally
went public in 1 999 and 2005, respectively).
44. See, e.g. , id. at 26 1 -62 .
45. William Power, Drexel 's Wall Street Rivals Swoop in to Pick Over What's Left of Dying Firm, WALL
ST. 1., Feb. IS, 1 99 0, at C l .
46. See, e.g. , id. (noting that "personnel defections are already rocking Drexel's 900-member commodities
group" and that the "uncertainty of whether Drexel employees will still be around a few days from now is one
reason rival firms are sizing up Drexel units somewhat warily").
47. See generally Michael Siconolfi, Drexel Has Sold 82% of Its Stock, Bonds Since Feb. 9, WALL ST. 1.,
Feb. 2 1 , 1 990, at C 1 3 (stating that Drexel announced sales "to 'comfort a lot of people' who were worried that a
mass liquidation could disrupt the markets").
48 . Id.
49. George Anders, From Junk Market to Flea Market: Drexel Holds Liquidation Sale, WALL ST. 1., June
11,1990, at Cl.
50. See, e.g. , Anders, supra note 40 (noting that the reorganized entity's principal function would be
managing a $450 million junk bond portfolio).
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The most sensItIve and contentious issue in Drexel ' s bankruptcy was resolving a
blizzard of securities fraud litigation, which consisted of dozens of suits in which Drexel
was a defendant and another set of claims (mostly suits against Milken, current Drexel
president Fred Joseph, and other Drexel executives) in which Drexel was one of the
p laintiffs. Both bundles of cases were eventually assigned to District Judge Milton
Pollack, who had developed a national reputation for resolving complex, nationwide
litigation. 51 Judge Pollack was initially asked to value the suits against Drexel for the
purposes of determining the amount of their claims in the bankruptcy case.

He

subsequently pushed for a global settlement of the litigation against Milken and the other
defendants. Once Judge Pollack successfully brokered a deal on the Milken l itigation
which he tearfully proclaimed as "his lifetime masterpiece"-the case quickly moved to
completion. 52 Drexel was reorganized as a much smaller firm, known as New Street
Capital , that would manage

$450 million in junk bonds that had not been sold and also

provide advisory services. 53
Drexel ' s trip through the b ankruptcy courts offers several early lessons about
resolving the financial distress of investment banks and other financial institutions. The
first was

simply that

investment banks are not precluded from reorganizing

bankruptcy. Although brokerages theoretically must be liquidated under Chapter

in

7 if they

file for bankruptcy, Drexel sidestepped this obstacle by putting its holding company
rather than the brokerage subsidiary into bankruptcy. 54 The brokerage subsidiary was

kept out until all of the customer accounts had been moved to other entities . 55 Second,
Drexel showed, nearly two decades before Lehman, that bankruptcy need not take too
long to effectively resolve the financial distress of a financial institution. Drexel filed for
bankruptcy in

1 990, at a time when delay was seen as a great shortcoming of Chapter
56
1 1 . To be sure, the case did take more than two years to complete. But even in an era o f

long cases, Drexel ' s most time sensitive assets were redeployed almost immediately, long
before the eventual reorganization. 5 7 Although Drexel ' s competitors derived more
benefit from the redeployment than Drexel did, this is not problematic from the
perspective of overall social welfare. Assuring that value not be destroyed is the principal

5 1 . See, e.g. , Jonathan M. Moses, Pollack to Oversee Big Milken Settlement, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1992,
at B I 0 (providing an overview of the litigation and Judge Pollack's role in its resolution).
52. See Editorial, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1993, at A8.
53. See Anders, supra note 40.
54. The exclusion from Chapter I I is in I I V. S.c. § 109(d) (2006), which excepts stockbrokers and
commodities brokers from Chapter 1 1. For an argument that the exclusion should be removed, see David A.
Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Boundary Games, BROOK. 1. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. (forthcoming 2010).
55. See, e.g. , Siconolfi et a!., supra note 34 (noting the brokerage subsidiary was not initially put in
bankruptcy); Wade Lambert, Drexel Subsidiaries Seek Protection Under Chapter 1 1 , WALL ST. J., May 30,
1990 (reporting that the brokerage and fourteen other subsidiaries filed for Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy).
56. See, e.g. , Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 1 1 , 1993 WIse. L. REv. 729, 752 (discussing
data about the time companies spend in Chapter I I and advocating procedural changes to reduce delay).
57. During the same period as Drexel's bankruptcy, many bank and S&L holding companies also filed for
bankruptcy. These bankruptcies followed a very similar pattern, with the debtor dealing with its human capital
assets quite quickly and deploying its tangible assets on a more leisurely time frame. One of the more colorful
illustrations is Southeast Banking Corp., a large Miami-based bank whose managers had assembled a large
contemporary art collection to adorn its halls. After its assets were sold, the firm eventually reorganized as an
art dealership. See, e.g. , Martha Brannigan, Buy Our Art, Please: Southeast Banking to Return as Gallery,
WALL ST. 1 . , Nov. 18, 1 994, at B9C.
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concern; it is less important who gets the value.
Even

from an ex post perspective,

the

Drexel bankruptcy

was

surprisingly

successful. Drexel ' s general creditors received more than half of what they were owed, 5 8

and the company managed t o achieve a limited reorganization despite the government ' s
refusal t o allow i t t o resume its former business. Drexel was further constrained by a
perception that the reorganized entity might still be subj ect to litigation based on its prior
misbehavior. 59 Financial institutions that do not enter bankruptcy under similar clouds
have much more room to maneuver in Chapter 11 .

B. Lehman Brothers
The Drexel bankruptcy suggests that bankruptcy is surprisingly well-designed to
handle the failures of nonbank financial firms. Contrary to the assumptions of many
commentators, bankruptcy judges are perfectly capable of overseeing prompt sales of
assets where speed is essential. Lehman, the other great inve stment bank filing, is in
many respects a poor test of the efficacy of bankruptcy. 60 The bailout of Bear Steams
had sent a strong signal to the markets that the government would rescue any large
nonbank financial institution that stumbled. Lehman, its potential buyers, and j ust about
everyone else fully expected a bailout as the bank desperately trolled for buyers in its
final days. 6 1 By refusing to provide funding, Treasury Secretary Paulson and other
regulators essentially dumped Lehman into bankruptcy. 62 Lehman could hardly have
been less prepared for Chapter

1 1.

Yet the bankruptcy process has been remarkably effective in many respects. Three
days after filing for bankruptcy on September

1 5 , 2008, Lehman arranged a sale of its

North American investment banking business to Barclays, and the sale was quickly
approved by the court after a lengthy hearing. 6 3 Barclays provided a $450 million debtor
in-possession loan to fund Lehman's operations through the completion of the sale. 64 As
is common, the loan agreement required Lehman to appoint a professional turnaround

manager to run the company. 65 Its operations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia were

58 . Drexel 's nonlitigating creditors would be paid $ 1 .5 3 billion on their $2.6 billion of claims, and the
securities claimants would share $475 million. See Wade Lambert, Drexel Plan Calls/or Fixed Creditors to Get
$ 1 . 53 Billion, WALL ST. 1., May 1 4, 1 99 1 , at B5.
59. See, e.g. , Anders, supra note 40.
60. For a similar argument, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance in the Ruins, 1 2 2 HARV. L. REv. 696, 740
(2008).
6 1 . See, e.g. , Yalman Onaran & John Helyar, Lehman 's Last Days, BLOOMBERG MARKETS, Jan. 2009, at
50, 59.
62. See, e.g., id. at 62 ("Fuld was stunned . . . when Paulson didn 't throw him a lifeline in the end.").
Paulson has subsequently claimed that regulators were hamstrung by a lack of legal authority to provide a
rescue loan, as in a new book chronicling the crisis, HENRY M. PAULSON JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE
TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 209, 229-3 0 (20 1 0), but a decision to signal
regulators' toughness seems a more likely explanation. See, e.g., SORKIN, supra note 9, at 3 24 (relating that
Paulson and Geithner stated that they weren 't getting involved), 5 3 6 (noting that the Fed and Treasury initially
said they were sending a signal, then subsequently insisted they had been powerless to step in); Onaran &
Helyar, supra note 6 1 , at 6 1 ("Paulson was putting out the word there would be no more federal bailouts, that
the government couldn 't rescue every failing investment bank.").
63 . See, e.g., Ben Hallman, A Moment 's Notice, AMERICAN LAW., Dec. 2008, at 85 , 9 1 .
64. See, e.g., John Blakeley, Court Blesses Rules For Lehman Sale, THE DAILY DEAL, Sept. 1 9, 2008.
65. See, e.g. , In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. et a!., at 7 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13 2 008) (interim
,
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bought by Nomura, a large Japanese brokerage firm. 66
The Lehman bankruptcy illustrates several key features of Chapter

1 1 even more

vividly than Drexel and other prior financial institution bankruptcies. First, it shows that
the law can facilitate an acquisition inside bankruptcy that would be troublesome outside
bankruptcy. Barclays had expressed interest in Lehman prior to its filing, but would not
acquire Lehman without substantial government assistance. 67 After Lehman filed,
B arclays was willing to purchase the assets it found most valuable, and also provided the
financing required to keep Lehman liquid. The second feature is the speed with which
acquisitions can be completed. Some commentators have argued that Chapter

1 1 is an

inappropriate solution to distress because the process is too slow and costly. 68 The

Lehman case shows exactly the opposite: faced with extreme time pressure, buyers
materialized, and Lehman quickly sold its viable subsidiaries, allowing them to remain in
business under different ownership .
Other commentators have expressed the opposite concern: that bankruptcy leads to

an immediate dumping of assets. 6 9 The "fire sale" of valuable assets at depressed prices
in a b ankruptcy reduces creditor recoveries 70 and can lead to failures in other firms that
hold the same assets. This concern was an important motivation for the decision to extend
rescue financing to AIG . 7 1 Whatever its accuracy with AIG, the fire sale obj ection has no
more support in the Lehman case than worries about bankruptcy delay. As of mid

2009,

Lehman continued to hold a significant portfolio o f assets, including a loan portfolio, real

order (i) authorizing debtor to obtain postpetition fInancing pursuant to sections 363 and 364 of Bankruptcy
Code, (ii) granting liens and superpriority claims to postpetition lenders pursuant to section 364 of Bankruptcy
Code, and (iii) scheduling fInal hearing) ("Borrower shall have appointed Mr. Brian Marsal of Alvarez &
Marsal, LLC as chief restructuring offIcer (the 'Chief Restructuring OffIcer'), on terms reasonably acceptable to
Administrative Agent and Requisite Lenders.").
66. See, e.g., Alison Tudor, Crisis on Wall Street: Nomura Grows in Europe As It Buys More ofLehman,
WALL ST. 1. , Sept. 24 , 2 008 , at C2 .
67. See, e.g. , Onaran & Helyar, supra note 6 1 , at 6 1 (noting that U.S. regulators declined to make the debt
guarantee necessary to save the deal). The U.K. 's Financial Services Authority also seems to have insisted on
U.S. fInancing before it would give its blessing to the proposed sale. See, e.g. , PAULSON, supra note 62, at 2 1 0I I (suggesting that the FSA balked, and hesitated to waive a shareholder vote that would otherwise be
required).
68. See Luigi Zingales, Why Paulson is Wrong, ECONOMIST' S VOICE, Sept. 2 008, available at
http ://www.bepress.comJev/voIS/issS/art2 (arguing that Chapter 1 1 burdens the taxpayer).
69. Lynn LoPucki has been the most prominent critic of bankruptcy sales. See, e.g. , Lynn M. LoPucki &
Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 1 06 MICH. L. REv. I (2 007).
70. Some commentators have suggested that Lehman sold its investment banking businesses at too Iow a
price. But any inadequacy in the price seems to have stemmed more from Lehman' s failure to prepare for a
bankruptcy fIling than from bankruptcy itself. See, e.g. , Jeffrey McCracken, Lehman 's Chaotic Bankruptcy
Filing Destroyed Billions in Value, WALL ST. 1., Dec. 29, 2 008, at A I O. The prospect of a rescue loan, which
Lehman fully expected, created a disincentive to take steps to maximize the fIrm's value in the event of
bankruptcy. This effect is discussed further infra in the text accompanying notes 86-87.
7 1 . Federal Reserve offIcials used precisely these terms to defend the AIG loan. While acknowledging that
"[a]n eventual liquidation of the company is most likely," they argued that "with the government loan, the
company won 't have to go through a tumultuous fire sale." The Fed also issued a statement suggesting that "a
disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant levels of financial market fragility and lead to
substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth and materially weaker economic performance."
Tami Luhby, Fed in AIG Rescue - $85B Loan, CNNMONEY.COM, Sept. 1 7, 2 008, http://money.cnn .coml2008/
09/ 1 6/news/companies/AIGlindex.htm.
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estate, and private equity investments. 72 The firm's ability to obtain priority financing in
bankruptcy has allowed them to take time with these assets, and sell them into the market
at a time and price that is driven more by value maximization than by a desperate
scramble for liquidity. 73
Third, the bankruptcy laws provide numerous formal and informal mechanisms for
creditors to exercise control over the liquidation process. These include formal rights
given to creditors' committees, the opportunity of creditors to obj ect to the terms and
timing of asset sales, and indirect control over the debtor through covenants in DIP loan
agreements. 74
To be sure, the process of selling assets in bankruptcy is not without its conflicts and
inefficiencies, as we have each written in prior work. 75 In particular, a recent study co
authored by one of this Article's authors finds some evidence that fire sales do occur in
Chapter 1 1 , due to the control rights in bankruptcy exerted by senior, secured lenders. 76
Thus, it is overly simplistic to assume that creditors in bankruptcy act as a single, value
maximizing constituency. But the government-managed alternative has its own corporate
governance problems.

v. F IRM- S PECIFIC C OSTS OF GOVERNMENT AD- Hoc RESCUE
The discussion thus far has sought to dispel the widespread belief that bankruptcy
could not possibly be an effective means of resolving the financial distress of a financial
institution. We will later consider the most significant limitation of bankruptcy-that it
does not address systemic risk concerns. But we first explore the strategy that has been
used throughout the recent financial crisis: ad hoc rescues. We begin by describing the
conditions under which rescues are most effective. We then show the serious distortions
they can cause.

A . The Case /or Rescue Loans: Illiquidity vs. Insolvency
Understanding the key differences between bankruptcy resolution and rescue
lending requires us to introduce one more distinction, the distinction-familiar to the
77 When a company arrives at the
finance literature-between illiquidity and insolvency.
brink of a bankruptcy filing and is seeking a rescue loan, it is at minimum

illiquid-it

72. See generally Alvarez & Marsal, The State 0/ the Estate, Nov. 1 8, 2009, available at
http://documents.epiq l l .comlViewDocument.aspx?DocumentPk=994B73 1 8-36B2-4828-AEDE9 12AE24EA6C l .
73. According to a November 2009 report to the creditors' committee, Lehman holds $2.9 billion in cash,
which suggests that its liquidity position improved in the months after its bankruptcy filing. !d. at 9.
74. See, e.g. , 1 1 U. s .C. § 363(b)( l ) (2006) (requiring notice and hearing for sale of assets); David A.
Skeel, Jr. , Creditors ' Ball: The "New " New Corporate Governance in Chapter 1 1 , 1 52 U. PENN. L. REv. 9 1 7
(2003) (discussing the recent prevalence of DIP financer control); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K . Rasmussen,
The End a/Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REv. 75 1 (2002) (same).
75. Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 27 ; Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based
Explanation /or Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 425 (2006); Skeel, supra note
22, at 1 929-32.
76. See generally Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 27.
77. See, e.g. , Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises, 60 1.
FIN. 6 1 5 (2005) (discussing the interaction between liquidity and solvency problems).
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does not have access to enough cash to remain current on its immediate obligations. At
the same time, it is likely, but not guaranteed, that the firm is also

insolvent-the value of

all its liabilities exceeds the total value of its assets. The two are usually observed
together in the rescue context because if a firm is illiquid but obviously solvent it should
be able, at least under ordinary circumstances, to obtain new financing backed by its
existing assets without the need for government assistance. Given that financial markets
are imperfect, though, it is possible for a firm to be illiquid yet solvent.
With a rescue loan, as contrasted with a bankruptcy filing, the government uses
outside money to keep the firm liquid so the firm can continue paying its debts, rather
than suspending the firm's obligations through bankruptcy ' s automatic stay. In the rescue
loan context, the degree of taxpayer commitment will depend on the relationship between
the firm ' s liquidity and its solvency. If the firm is only slightly illiquid and obviously
solvent, a small, short-term government loan can be extended to the firm in exchange for
a security that is very likely to repay taxpayers in full . The loan need only remain in place
until the firm 's liquidity problem subsides, and the temporary intervention will prevent
firm value from being destroyed through premature liquidation. This ideal scenario is the

best-case scenario for government intervention. 78

B. Direct Costs to Taxpayers
More frequent, however, particularly with financial firms during an economic crisis,
is the opposite scenario: the firm has a large and prolonged liquidity shortfall, and

liabilities that greatly exceed its assets. 79 Financial firms rely heavily on short-term
liabilities, and in financial crisis, of course, new lending is difficult to obtain. 80 In such
circumstances, the government faces a difficult choice: if the government provides a
rescue loan, they may be stuck with a large and long-term commitment of taxpayer
money, whereas not intervening could mean a fire sale liquidation of assets that damages
the firm, its counterparties, and possibly the financial system more generally.
This tension was demonstrated clearly in the rescue of AIG. Fearing that default
would have devastating effects, particularly on the credit default swap market, regulators

arranged a rescue loan. 8 1 Given the extent of AIG 's illiquidity problem, the original loan

78 . The Chrysler bailout in 1979-1 980 and, internationally, the bailout of the Mexican government in
1 994 are often cited as examples of rescue loans that successfully quelled a liquidity crisis at relatively little
cost to taxpayers. See, e.g. , Andrew Beattie, Chrysler Bailout 2009: Third Time 's a Charm ?, FINANCIAL EDGE,
June 4, 2009, available at http://financialedge.investopedia.comlfinancial-edge/0609/Chrysler-Bailout-2009Third-Times-A-Charm.aspx (noting that the 1 979 Chrysler bailout is seen as a success); LEX RIEFFEL,
RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD Hoc MACHINERY 200--02 (2003) (stating that the results
of the Mexican bailout were "stunning" and the "U.S. government actually made money"). This is not to say
that either was cost-free. Both introduced some of the distortions discussed below.
79. This certainly was the case with Lehman, as its unsecured debt traded for less than ten cents on the
dollar after its bankruptcy filing, suggesting deep insolvency. See, e.g. , Shannon D. Harrington & Neil Unmack,
Lehman Credit-Swap Auction Sets Payout 0/91 . 38 Cents, BLOOMBERG. COM, Oct. 1 0, 2008 (noting that auction
to determine credit default swap payouts suggested value of debt was 8.625 cents on the dollar).
80. See, e.g. , B runnermeier, supra note 1 6 (discussing the financial markets and related events in 2001 and
2008).
8 1 . According to a subsequent report by the Special Investigator General for TARP, Federal Reserve and
Treasury officials feared a panoply of potential consequences if AIG stopped making payments to
counterparties: "the impact on the American retirement system [because many retirement plans had bought
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was o f unprecedented size

($85 billion). 8 2 The terms (short maturity and high interest

rate) were intended to give AIO a clear incentive to pay back the loan quickly to avoid a
long-term taxpayer commitment. 8 3 This soon proved to be impossible. By November,
AIO convinced the Fed and Treasury that the initial loan terms could not be met without
forcing AIO to conduct a fire sale of its assets. 84 As a result, the government extended
the maturity of the loan (to five years from two), dramatically cut interest rates (by
increased the amount of committed funding (to nearly

5.5%),

$150 billion), and agreed to take

lower priority securities (preferred stock) in exchange for some of the new money. 85 All

of these changes reduced the possibility of a fire sale, but they required a longer and
larger taxpayer commitment to the firm.

C. Moral Hazard (ofEquity and Debt)
If the firm is in fact insolvent (that is, its liabilities exceed its assets), losses must b e
borne by someone. Rescue lending i s designed t o prevent a firm' s creditors and
counterparties from bearing these losses (at least temporarily), for fear of the systemic
consequences that would follow. Taking extraordinary step s to protect the credit markets
can have a significant price tag, however, in terms of both the direct costs discussed in
the previous section and the incentives it creates for investors.
The principal incentive problem is moral hazard. Moral hazard is the familiar
concern that someone who is protected against the consequences of a risk has less
incentive to take precautions against the risk. If the investors who fund a financial
institution by lending money or buying stock anticipate that the firm will be rescued if it
runs into trouble, they may extend funding beyond what they would extend otherwise.
This willingness to continue funding may enable the firm to delay a needed restructuring
of operations or a merger with a healthy acquirer.
The possibility of sub sidized taxpayer funding on the eve of bankruptcy also
encourages both potential investors and the firm itself to play a dangerous game of
chicken with the government . A potential acquirer of a distressed firm might, in lieu of
making the acquisition at an earlier date, wait until the target 's condition is so desperate
that it can argue for taxpayer assistance as a prerequisite to completion of the deal. 86
Similarly, the managers o f the troubled firm may deliberately fail to take step s to prepare
for bankruptcy since the firm' s case for a governmental subsidy becomes stronger if

'stable value fund' contracts from AIG] ; the impact of AIG's commercial paper obligations, the broader effect
on the already frozen credit markets and money market mutual funds; and the considerable systemic risk to the
global financial system." OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET REL IEF
PROGRAM (SIGTARP), FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS TO LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG COUNTERPARTIES 9 (Nov.
17, 2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/auditJ2009/Factors_AffectinILEfforts_to_LimiC
Payments_to_AIG_Counterparties.pdf.
82. Id. at 1-2; Sjostrom, supra note 24, at 964.
8 3 . The original $85 billion loan was for a 24-month term, the interest rate on the loan was 8 . 5 % above
LIB OR, and AIG was required to pay 8 . 5 % on the undrawn portion of the credit facility. See id. at 964.
84. !d. at 969-70.
85 . After a second restructuring in March 2009, estimates of the government commitment to AIG now
range from $ 1 80 billion to $200 billion. See, e.g., Sjostrom, supra note 24, at 972-74 (describing restructured
facility), 975 (estimating commitment at $182.5 billion).
86. See, e.g. , Onaran & Helyar, supra note 6 1 (discussing expectations by Lehman and its potential
purchasers that the government would provide funding).
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bankruptcy is not a realistic option. 87 Thus, the possibility o f rescue funding may
contribute to the exact instability that government backing is trying to prevent.
In several distressed corporations' resolutions, particularly those that o ccurred at the
onset of the crisis, the government made a deliberate attempt to penalize shareholders in
connection

with

government-backed

rescue

deals

to

limit

moral

hazard.

When

government loans were used to back a sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan Chase, for
example, all o f Bear Stearns 's liabilities were assumed by the buyer, but the original
purchase price of the shares was forced substantially below the trading price of the
stock. 88 In the original terms of the AIG rescue loan, the government took warrants
allowing it to purchase just under

80% of the equity, which severely diluted AIG ' s

existing shareholders. 8 9 These measures were designed to limit some of the moral hazard
concerns expressed above, while at the same time limiting the systemic risks that come
from allowing creditors to take losses.
This "hybrid" solution (subsidizing creditors and penalizing shareholders) addresses
the problem of shareholder moral hazard, but magnifies the moral hazard of debt.
Investors may bid down the stock of the debtor, but the policy gives lenders no reason to
stop extending credit. If markets anticipate the policy, distressed firms might find it even
more difficult to issue new equity to repair their balance sheets. 90 The penalty to
shareholders thus adds to market frictions like debt overhang that make equity issues
difficult, as we have discussed. 9 1 Rather than attempting to sell stock to raise capital
when they face a liquidity crisis, firms will tum toward the most subsidized security
(debt). The added debt can exacerbate the firm's financial distress and create a greater
necessity for last-minute rescue efforts.

D. Corporate Governance Distortions
Still another cost of rescue loans is corporate governance distortions. Rescue loans
often bring government intervention in the internal governance of the company receiving
a loan. Management turnover is the norm for companies in financial distress, but
ordinarily companies' investors drive the decision. 9 2 When the government insists that a

87. During the recent crisis, both Lehman and General Motors seem to have deliberately failed to prepare
for bankruptcy, quite possibly for these reasons. See, e.g. , McCracken, supra note 70 (discussing Lehman 's
failure to prepare for bankruptcy); Philip Nussel, Wagoner's Words Underscore Industry Crisis, AUTOMOTIVE
NEWS, Mar. 30, 2 009 (quoting former GM CEO Rick Wagoner's insistence that bankruptcy would be "a highly
risky and highly costly process" and should not be considered).
8 8 . Indeed, the Treasury apparently pressured the buyer to pay less than it originally intended, precisely to
insure that Bear Steams's shareholders were punished. Kate Kelly, Bear Steams Neared Collapse Twice in
Frenzied Final Week, WALL ST. 1 . , May 2 9 , 2008, at A I .
89 . See, e.g., Sjostrom, supra note 24, a t 966 (noting that the government stake was "purposely set below
80% so that it would not have to consolidate AIG's financials with its own").
90. The expectation of future government intervention seems to have played a role in the ultimate
resolution of Fannie Mae 's and Freddie Mac 's distress. According to one account: "Two things would soon
force Treasury's hand. Uncertainty about Treasury's plans and how any intervention would affect shareholders
caused shares of Fannie and Freddie to fall sharply, making it all but impossible for them to raise equity."
Deborah Solomon et aI., Mounting Woes Left Officials With Little Room to Maneuver, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8,
2 008, at A I .
9 1 . See supra notes 1 3- 1 4 and accompanying text.
92 . See, e.g. , M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation When Agency
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CEO be replaced-as when Treasury S ecretary Paulson insisted that AIG CEO Robert
Willumstad resign as a condition of government help-the decision is likely to be
influenced by factors other than optimal corporate governance, such as concern for the
public response to the rescue. 93
The distortions may be still greater if the government oversees the investment
decisions made by the company even after the initial rescue loan. 9 4 Two of AIG ' s most
recent replacement CEOs, E dward Liddy and Robert B enmosche, have encountered
significant difficulty trying to maximize the ongoing value of AIG while complying with
public oversight and scrutiny over compensation practices. Liddy faced sharp criticism
over the decision to pay retention bonuses to employees in the Financial Products
division. 95 Benmosche publicly expressed his frustration over the constraints on
executive compensation imposed by Kenneth Feinberg, the Obama administration ' s "pay
czar," and threatened to quit his post. Though he chose not to resign, Benmosche argued
that compensation constraints are a "barrier" that "stands in the way of restoring AIG 's
,,
value. 9 6 Both because of the limits of their expertise and because of the conflicting
pressures it faces, the government's track record when it shifts from regulator to decision
maker is not a good one. 9 7

E. A Comparison to Bankruptcy Resolution
As discussed earlier, the bankruptcy process provides alternative solutions to the
firm ' s liquidity problems through the automatic stay and DIP financing. 9 8 The automatic
stay puts a stop to creditor collection activity. As a result, the size of a new loan required
to maintain operations need not be as large inside of bankruptcy as a rescue loan would

Costs A re Low, 1 01 Nw. U. L. REv. 1543, 1 595-96 (2007) (finding that "over 60% of CEOs were replaced in
the zone of insolvency," and attributing this to the influence of creditors).
93 . See generally Sjostrom, supra note 24, at 967 (noting Paulson's insistence that Willumstad resign).
Several of the recent rescues also interfered with established corporate law doctrine. The sale of Bear Steams to
J.P. Morgan, for instance, included deal protection provisions (such as a 39% share exchange) that cannot easily
be squared with the fiduciary duty standards of Delaware corporate law. See, e.g. , Marcel Kahan & Edward
Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware and the Strategic Use of
Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 7 13, 72 1 -44 (2009). The government-brokered interference with settled law may be
treated as sui generis, but it also could add uncertainty to corporate transactions.
94. The bailouts of Chrysler and General Motors raise these issues. The government originally planned to
put significant decision making authority in a single "car czar." GM and its unions delayed serious negotiations
while they awaited appointment of the czar. The Obama administration later shifted course, appointing a panel
rather than a single czar. The government dictated the car companies' decisions to file for bankruptcy and the
terms of their restructuring through a "sale" of each company' assets. See David von Drehle, Saying No to a
Car
Czar:
A
Smart First Step
on
Detroit,
TIME,
Feb.
17,
2009,
available
at
http://www.time.comltime/politics/articie/0.8599. 18 80077.00.html; Steve Rattner, The Auto Bailout: How We
Did It, FORTUNE, Oct. 2 1 , 2009.
95. See, e.g. , Michael R. Crittenden & Patrick Yoest, AIG 's Liddy Asks Employees to Give Back Bonuses,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009.
9 6. See, e.g. , Serena Ng et ai. , AIG CEO Says He 's 'Committed ' to Leading Insurer, WALL ST. J., Nov.
1 2, 2009, at C l .
97. The most notorious illustration was the National Recovery Administration during the New Deal,
which attempted to establish guidelines for industry cooperation . The shortcomings of the NRA, "a big, splashy
bad idea that lasted only a couple of years," are discussed in JONATHAN ALTER, THE DEFINING MOMENT:
FDR' s HUNDRED DAYS AND THE TRIUMPH OF HOPE 30 1-03 (2006).
98. See supra notes 22-24, 28-29 and respective accompanying text.
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be, because the loan proceeds can be directed to operations and not to the repayment of
pre-b ankruptcy creditors. This increases the likelihood that a private loan wil l be
available. Al so, because a DIP loan is senior in priority to pre-bankruptcy unsecured
creditors, the pre-bankruptcy creditors bear more of the costs of the reorganization
process. As compared to rescue loans, DIP loans are likely to be smaller in size and to
significantly reduce the moral hazard of debt. 99
Finally, since the priority of DIP lenders, pre-bankruptcy creditors, and shareholders
is determined by the rules of the bankruptcy process, predictability of recoveries is
greater than it would be under an ad-hoc system o f rescue lending. Shareholder interests
can be, and usually are, eliminated in bankruptcy. 1 00 But if the firm is solvent,
shareholders are entitled to receive a di stribution. 1 0 1 Relative to the hybrid solution
described above , this facilitates the issuance of equity prior to bankruptcy.
A system-wide lending failure like the recent credit crisis raises the question
whether private sources of bankruptcy financing will always be available. Through much
of 2008 , few companies that filed for bankruptcy were able to obtain financing. 1 02 It is
important to keep in mind that the absence of lending at the height of the crisis was
aberrational, and more recent cases suggest that funding is once again becoming
available. 1 03 However, if private financing becomes scarce, the bankruptcy framework
does not prevent the Treasury from serving as a troubled firm's DIP financer. Any doubt
about this possibility was removed by the government ' s decision to provide billions of
dollars of DIP financing to both Chrysler and General Motors as part of the carmakers'
government-orche strated restructurings. 1 04
VI. S YSTEMIC RISK CONSIDERATIONS : Is B ANKRUPTCY ApPROPRIATE ?
With respect to firm-specific costs, the first ostensible shortcoming of bankruptcy,
we are skeptical that government rescue is likely to create more value than the
bankruptcy alternative. However, systemic risk issues pose more difficult questions. In

99. In this respect, the AIG circumstances were particularly favorable to a rescue loan. AIG was
apparently able to make the rescue lender senior to all existing liabilities (as a DIP loan would have been)
without triggering a negative covenant in its existing debt that would have accelerated other obligations. See,
e.g. , Sjostrom, supra note 24, at 967 (describing security given by AIG). In most circumstances, a company
would not have sufficient unencumbered assets for the government to make this kind of loan outside of
bankruptcy. Thus, the rescue loan would need to be a low-priority, subsidized loan.
1 00. See, e.g. , Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REv. 673
(2003).
1 0 1 . The absolute priority rule set forth in I I U.S.C. § 1 1 29(b) (2006) assures the creditors in a class that,
unless the class will be paid in full, lower priority creditors or shareholders are not entitled to any payout.
1 02. Lending did not disappear altogether. Some companies, such as Circuit City and Pilgrim' s Pride,
managed to obtain DIP financing. See, e.g. , Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., I 1 0th Congo 4 (2008)
(statement of Dr. Edward I. Altman, Leonard N. Stem School of Business, New York University), available at
http://financialservices.house.govihearingl l O/altman 1 20508 .pdf.
1 03 . CIT, for instance, arranged a $ 1 billion DIP loan from Carl !cahn for its prepackaged bankruptcy. See,
e.g. , Tiffany Kary, Dawn McCarty & Lester Pimentel, CIT Files Bankruptcy; u.s. Unlikely to Recoup Money,
BLOOMERG.COM, Nov. 1 , 2009, available at http://www . bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2060 1 087&sid=
a3 .CGrxbL2U#.
1 04. For a detailed analysis of the government's role in the carmaker bankruptcies, especially Chrysler, see
Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chlysler Bankruptcy, 1 08 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 20 1 0),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfrn ?abstracUd= 1 426530.
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their recent interventions, government officials were concerned not only about the going
concern value of the troubled entitie s themselves, but also about the impact that entities'
bankruptcy filings would have on counterparties and other creditors . The principal
precedent for this concern is the collapse of Long Term Capital Management, a hedge
fund whose founders included two Nobel laureates, in 1 99 8 . 1 05
The current fear is certainly not without foundation. When Lehman Brothers filed
for bankruptcy, these effects did materialize. Lehman had a substantial amount of
commercial paper (short-term, unsecured debt) at the time of its filing. 1 06 This paper was
held by numerous money market funds. Since commercial paper has such a short
maturity, it is usually considered quite safe, and carries a high credit rating; however,
when Lehman filed for Chapter

1 1 holders of commercial paper suddenly became

unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy that promises a low recovery.
The consequences of the counterparti es' newly precarious status were immediate
and substantial. Money market funds that held Lehman commercial paper, including one
prominent fund called the Reserve Primary Fund, were forced to mark down the value of
these holdings. 1 07 This led to investor redemption requests, forcing the fund to sell its
holdings into the market at depressed prices, which exacerbated the fund' s problems.
Reserve Primary Fund ultimately "broke the buck"-valued its holdings at less than one
dollar per share . Reserve Primary' s travails precip itated a run on the fund that led it to
suspend redemptions. 1 08
While causal ity is difficult to establish, most observers believe that the fear resulting
from the Lehman filing and its implications for Reserve Primary Fund spilled over into
redemption requests at other money market funds, many of which had negligible
expo sure to Lehman. Systemic concerns were substantial, because many corporate
borrowers rely on the commercial paper market to fund their short-term operations, and a
run

on money market funds takes needed capital out of this market. The Federal Reserve

was forced to step in and provide government guarantees of money market funds, which
provided some relief. 109 Nevertheless, short-term debt markets were severely strained.
The Lehman/Reserve Primary Fund situation illustrates the difficult choice between
providing a government rescue to prevent systemic consequences like these and limiting
moral hazard. Reserve Primary Fund was far from typical in the money market world. It
offered its investors some of the highest yields in the industry and was known to be a

1 05 . See, e.g. ,

PRESIDENT ' S WORKING

GROUP ON

FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND

( 1999), available at http://www. ustreas.gov/press/
releaseslreports/hedgfund.pdf (outlining the systemic risk implications of the Long-Term Capital Management
collapse).
106. Commercial paper is unsecured debt issued by companies that wish to borrow funds on a short-term
basis. Because the borrowers have traditionally been large, stable companies, and the obligation is repaid or
rolled over quickly, the risk to lenders ordinarily is quite low. See, e.g., DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST:
BEN BERNANKE ' S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 207 (2009) (describing commercial paper as "IOUs . . . that were
backed only by the company's promise to pay").
107. See, e.g. , Diana B. Henriques, Buck Broken, but Timing May Affect Redemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2008, at B4; WESSEL, supra note 106, at 206-07.
1 08. See, e.g. , Henriques, supra note 107; WESSEL, supra note 106.
109. See WESSEL, supra note 106, at 228 (describing how the Fed wanted to intervene to alleviate the
concern over money market funds).
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
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substantial risk taker. 1 1 0 Its investors understood (or at least should have understood) that
these outlier rates could only be had by accepting large risks. Had the government
provided a rescue loan to Lehman to prevent a bankruptcy filing, it would have
subsidized this type of speculation (commonly known as a "moral hazard play"), I I I and
lessened the incentive of investors to monitor borrowers and take sensible risks. On the
other hand, the panic run from the money market industry might have been prevented by
a loan (or a subsidy) that enabled Lehman to make its counterparties whole.
These trade-offs are real and difficult to resolve. The most important systemic
consequences of Lehman ' s bankruptcy followed not from its direct effects, but from a
crisis of confidence. Economic theories can explain the consequences of panic runs when
they occur, but they do not explain what triggers them in the first place. Could an eve-of
bankruptcy rescue loan or merger have prevented the crisis of confidence that led to the
money market run? More generally, could a Lehman rescue loan have prevented the
severity of the financial crisis that followed? These questions are impossible to answer
with certainty, but a casual look at the data surrounding these events provides reason to
be skeptical. Below is a chart that documents changes in several maj or indices that
occurred the day after the Lehman bankruptcy filing was announced, compared with the
day following the AIG rescue loan.

1 25 1 .7

1 1 92.7

-4.7 1 %

1 2 1 3 .6

1 1 5 6.39

-4 .7 1 %

25 .66

3 1 .7

23 .54%

30.3

36 .22

1 9.54%

1 .35

2.01

0.66

2. 1 9

3 .02

0.84

1 .46

0.8 1

-0.65

0.86

0.02

-0.84

Looking across the four indices, the daily market reactions surrounding the news o f
the Lehman bankruptcy filing and the AIG rescue loan indicate that the reaction to the
AIG news was of equal, if not greater, magnitude . The fall in the stock market, as
measured by the S &P

500 index, was nearly identical. The rise in the VIX, an index used

to measure volatility (and informally known as the "fear index") saw a slightly higher
percentage increase following the Lehman bankruptcy. The TED spread, an indicator of

1 1 0. Karen Dolan, A Large Money Market Fund Breaks the Buck, MORNINGSTAR, Sept. 1 7, 2008,
http ://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=253485 ("Morningstar has data on just over 2, I00
money market funds, and the Reserve Primary Fund clocked in at an average trailing 1 2-month yield of
4. 04%-the highest in our universe-while the average was 2.75%.").
I I I . This phrase and the associated behavior are well-recognized in the context of sovereign rescue lending
by the International Monetary Fund. See generally Timothy Lane & Steven Phillips, Does IMF Financing
Result in Moral Hazard? (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/00/ l 68, 2000), available at
http://imf. org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wpOO 1 68. pdf.
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credit market risk, saw a larger percentage po int increase following the AIG bailout. 1 1 2
Similarly, yields on short-term U . S . Treasury bills (a measure of investor flight to safe
assets) saw a larger fall following the AIG news. I I 3
This evidence is far from conclusive. But it suggests, at a minimum, that the
widespread belief that the Lehman Chapter

1 1 filing was the singular cause of the
4
collapse in credit that followed is greatly overstated. 1 1 The comparison also highlights

that news of a maj or event can convey two distinct pieces of news at the same time: first,
that a large, important entity is severely distressed and illiquid; and second, that a
particular procedure

was triggered to

address

it.

In

Lehman,

the procedure

was

bankruptcy, while in AIG, the procedure was a rescue loan. The indicators above suggest
that the market did not distinguish between the distress resolution procedures; it focused
instead on the implications of the distress itself.
Moreover, as we have already indicated, the choice between bankruptcy and a
rescue loan is not an either/or choice. If regulators conclude that the systemic risk
concerns are so great that intervention is necessary, they could use an intermediate
strategy of allowing the firm to file for bankruptcy, while selectively guaranteeing certain
"dangerous" liabilities as an alternative to a rescue loan. 1 1 5 With hindsight, it appears
that guaranteeing AIG 's credit default swaps while allowing the company to file for
Chapter

11 might have been a much better solution than the increasingly expensive

rescue loan used to forestall AIG ' s default. The government might have facilitated a
restructuring of AIG while protecting the CDS market, at substantially lower cost.
It may be useful at this point to compare the approach just suggested-an
intermediate bankruptcy strategy-to the "prompt corrective action" approach now used
to resolve bank and S&L failures, which has some features in common. Under the prompt
corrective action rules, bank regulators are authorized to intervene even before a bank
becomes insolvent. Regulators step in and generally arrange an immediate sale-which is
set up in secret, often over a weekend-of the bank' s assets to another bank. 1 1 6 While
deposits are guaranteed, other liabilities are not. 1 17 The immediate sale guarantees

1 1 2 . The TED spread is the difference between 3-month LIBOR (an interest rate at which banks lend to
each other) and the 3-month U.S. Treasury Bill rate. See InvestorWords.com, TED spread Definition, http ://
investorwords.comlS 820/TED_spread.html (last visited Mar. 10, 20 I 0).
1 1 3 . Daily Treasury Bill Rates, U . S. Treasury, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-f inance/debt
managementlinterest-rate/daily-treas_bill_rates_historical_2008.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 20 I 0).
1 14. John Taylor has often offered additional, complementary evidence that Lehman 's role in the credit
crisis has been seriously distorted. See, e.g. , Banknlptcy and Anti/nlst Law and Financial Regulation: Hearing
Before the H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law, I I I th Congo 2 (2003) (statement of John B.
Taylor, Professor, Stanford University) (citing JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK (2009) and finding that
the biggest jump in the Libor-OIS spread came after the Treasury announced its plan to propose the major
rescue funding that eventually provided $700 billion in TARP funds).
1 15. For a suggestion along these lines, see Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Economists Have A bandoned
Principle, WALL ST. 1 . , Dec. 3, 2008, at A 1 7.
1 1 6. For a good overview of bank insolvency regulation, and a comparison to Chapter 1 1 , see Robert R.
Bliss & George G. Kaufman, u.s. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: A Comparison and Evaluation , 2
VA. L. & Bus. REv. 1 43 (2007 ).
1 17 . When Washington Mutual was merged with J.P. Morgan Chase through FDIC receivership, the
depositors and secured debt were assumed by J.P. Morgan. The senior unsecured and subordinated debt was not
assumed and will presumably be paid from the sale proceeds. The FDIC announced that subordinated debt
investors should not expect to recover anything. See Press Release, FDIC, Information for Claimants in
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liquidity, assuring that depositors never lose access to their funds, and minimizes the
systemic disruption of the bank ' s default. The rules also are designed to avoid any
possibility o f a disruption to the payment system. 1 1 8 In theory, the same approach might
be used to resolve the financial distress of investment banks or hedge funds, which have
similar characteristics. 1 1 9
In comparing the two options side-by-side, it is crucial to understand that the prompt
corrective action approach requires several elements to make it function effectively that
are not needed for Chapter

1 1 . It requires a pool of taxpayer money to cover depositor

losses, persistent ex ante regulatory oversight of bank assets and liabilities to limit the
magnitude of these losses, and the power of a regulator to trigger the resolution
unilaterally. 1 20 As a result, the chief benefits of this approach are most valuable in the
commercial bank context. As guarantor of bank deposits, which are the vast majority of a
bank 's liabilities, the government (and taxpayers) has an enormous stake in the health o f
banks. The depositors into whose shoes the government steps, b y contrast, have little
incentive to monitor, because they are fully protected. Given the government' s stake and
its role as the principal creditor, it is sensible to couple deposit insurance with ex ante
regulatory oversight and the power to determine how to resolve distress.
Important downsides exist to the prompt corrective action approach, in addition to
the need for taxpayer funds to back it. The system is designed to assure early closure of
troub led banks, and it relies on regulators to determine when and how to intervene, rather
than the parties with the best information-the bank ' s managers and investors. 1 2 1
Guaranteeing promptness o f the resolution procedure requires denying the rights o f the
bank 's unprotected investors (unsecured creditors and shareholders) to affect the terms
and timing of the resolution. To use bankruptcy terminology, the FDIC must have the
immediate authority to "cram down" a plan to resolve distress, over any obj ection by

Washington Mutual Bank (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/
pr08085b.html. The terms of the original Wachovia merger with Citigroup, by contrast, involved taxpayer
rescue money to shield investors from losses. See Press Release, FDIC, CitiGroup Inc. to Acquire Banking
Operations of Wachovia (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/
pr08088.html.
1 1 8. See, e.g. , B liss & Kaufman, supra note 1 1 6, at 147-49.
1 1 9. The Obama administration ' s financial reform proposals would extend bank regulators' powers to all
systemically important financial institutions, but would focus less on early intervention than on regulatory
authority. We assess the proposals infra in Part VIII.
120. When the FDIC arranges for the disposition of a troubled bank, it usualIy pays another bank to assume
the deposits, often as part of a transaction in which the acquirer also receives some of the troubled bank's assets.
See, e.g. , FDIC, RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 29-35 (2003), available at http ://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/
reshandbooklch3pas.pdf (describing "purchase and assumption" transactions) . In the less frequent case in which
a troubled bank is simply liquidated, the FDIC pays depositors directly. ld. at 4 1 -46.
1 2 1 . Regulators' track record on closing commercial banks during the current crisis has been checkered,
with IndyMac (which was not closed until well after its financial distress was obvious and is expected to cost
taxpayers $8 .5-9.4 billion) and Wachovia (where regulators arranged a lowball sale to Citigroup that was
quickly trumped) each involving significant miscues. See, e.g. , VERN Mc KINLEY & GARY GEGENHEIMER,
BRIGHT LINES AND BAILOUTS 1 8- 1 9 (2009) (describing the Wachovia sale); B inyamin Applebaum, FDIC
Agrees to Sell IndyMac to Investor Group, WA SH . POST, available at http ://www.washingtonpost.comlwp
dynicontentiarticle/2009/0 l /02/AR20090 1 0202228 .html (IndyMac). One of the authors of this Article has
argued elsewhere for an incentive system that would encourage managers of troubled banks to initiate
insolvency proceedings as a supplement to FDIC oversight. See generally David A . Skeel, Jr., The Law and
Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation, 76 TEX. L. R EV . 723 ( 1 998).

Bankruptcy or Bailouts?

20 1 0]

493

unprotected investors who are subj ect to bearing losses. While this is defensible with
commercial banks, because the vast maj ority of their liabilities are deposits, it is far more
problematic with other firms. The relative slowness of Chapter

11 resolutions is driven in

large part by the attempt to guarantee that the firm's stakeholders have some control over
the firm's fate, so that the value of the estate is preserved for investors. Thus, the "prompt
corrective action" model has some attractive features (namely, speed) that are more
appropriate to l imiting systemic risk. On the other hand, this system may create serious
firm-specific costs that Chapter 1 1 does not. 1 22
VII. SYSTEMIC CONCERNS WITHIN B ANKRUPTCY
To this point, we have assumed that bankruptcy itself is essentially neutral with
respect to systemic risk-that it neither addresses systemic risk issues nor exacerbates
them. The most important exceptions to this agnosticism are derivative c ontracts and
other new financial instruments. 1 23 In an effort to counteract systemic risk, lawmakers
have excepted derivatives and other financial contracts from several key bankruptcy
rules. Although the purpose of these provisions is reducing systemic risk, their efficacy is
subj ect to serious question.
Although most b ankruptcy lawyers and bankruptcy j udges do not know a great deal
about derivatives, the industry trade group and regulators who deal with them have long
insisted that these instruments must be exempted from the automatic stay and several
other core bankruptcy provisions so that a debtor's counterparties can close out their
contracts after the debtor files for bankruptcy. The International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) has argued, with the support of the Federal Reserve and Treasury,
that the bankruptcy of a company that has entered into a significant number of derivatives
could snarl the financial system if the automatic stay applied. 1 24 According to ISDA, a

1 22 . Another alternative that lies between a government-controlled, fast resolution like receivership and a
decentralized, investor-driven resolution like Chapter 1 1 would be a distress resolution mechanism that is pre
arranged contractually. For example, key financial institutions could be required to issue securities that
automatically convert from debt to equity under pre-specified conditions. One such proposal and the difficulties
in its implementation are discussed in Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories ofA merican Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 3 1 1 ( 1 99 3 ). Several commentators have explored a similar approach-the use of
distress contingent bonds-for financial institutions. See, e.g. , Mark 1. Flannery, Market-Valued Triggers Will
Work for Contingent Capital Instruments (unpublished manuscript, Nov. 6, 2009) (solicited submission to U.S.
Treasury Working Group on Bank Capital); Darrell Duffie, Contractual Methods for Out-or-Court
Restrncturing of Systemically Important Financial Institutions, in KENNETH SCOTT, GEORGE SHULTZ & JOHN
TAYLOR, ENDING GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS AS WE KNow THEM (forthcoming 20 1 0).
1 2 3 . A derivative is a contract with payment terms based on the change in value of something else, such as
an interest rate, a national currency, or a stock index. The bankruptcy laws give special treatment to five
categories of derivatives and other financial contracts: repurchase agreements, commodity contracts, forward
contracts, swap agreements, and securities contracts. See, e.g. , Shmuel Vasser, Derivatives in Bankrnptcy, 60
Bus. LAW. 1 507, 1 5 1 1 -25 (2005) (outlining the treatment of each).
1 24 . "Participants in the swap market," an ISDA representative testified in 1 989 , "are concerned that, if a
counterparty files for bankruptcy, the automatic stay and other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code could be
interpreted to bar [termination] . . . . These bankruptcy-related issues create uncertainty among potential
participants in [derivatives markets] , creating a risk that, particularly in periods of volatility, the liquidity of the
market will be restricted . . . " Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the
Comm. on the JudiCiary, 1 0 1 st Congo 16 (Apr. 1 1 , 1 989) (testimony of Mark C. Brickell, Chairman, ISDA)
[hereinafter 1989 Swap Hearing]. See also id. at 18 (noting Federal Reserve support for the proposed
.
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solvent counterparty' s inability to immediately terminate its contract could interfere with
its efforts to hedge and possibly even j eopardize the counterparty ' s solvency. 1 25 The
counterparty ' s instability could, in a worst case scenario, have a similar effect on its own
counterpartie s

as the

contagion

worked its way through the

market.

Exempting

derivatives from the automatic stay minimizes the risk of these ripple effects, ISDA and
other proponents argue, because it enables counterparties to close out their contracts and
to quickly re-hedge their risks. Based on this reasoning, Congress has amended the
bankruptcy laws four different times-most recently and sweepingly in 2005-to provide
increasingly expansive protection for derivatives. 1 2 6
Although the special provisions could reduce systemic risk i n some cases, they may
throw oil on the fire in others. Counterparties' ability to jettison their contracts when a
debtor files for bankruptcy can create a run on the debtor's assets, as numerous

counterparties terminate their contracts and seize any collateral securing the contracts. 1 2 7

If the debtor is one of the handful of major derivatives counterparties, the debtor's failure
could itself cause marketwide damage, since the glut of terminated contracts may
overwhelm the market ' s ability to provide replacements. 1 28
Recent developments show that this concern is not simply hypothetical. When
Lehman filed for bankruptcy, its counterparties canceled more than 700,000 of its over
900,000 derivatives contracts. 1 2 9 The simultaneous closing out of 7 00 ,000 contracts
threatened to create chaos both in the Lehman bankruptcy and in the derivatives market
generally. The effects were diminished somewhat by netting and by the inability of many
counterparties to retrieve assets to sati sfy their claims. 1 3 0 Counterparties whose contracts

amendments).
1 25. See, e.g. , id. at 12 (warning that "the nondefaulting party could suffer unexpected and perhaps
substantial losses" if not allowed to terminate).
1 26. The original exclusion, which was included in the 1 9 78 Code, applied only to commodities and
futures. The bankruptcy laws were subsequently amended to protect securities contracts in 1 9 82, repurchase
transactions in 1 984, swaps in 1 990, and, among other things, cross-product netting in 200 5 . Edward R.
Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from
Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 1 3 AM . BANKR. INST. L. REv. 64 1 , 644 (2005). The 2005 changes
were designed to ensure that any transaction that can plausibly be construed as a derivative is protected. As
Edward Morrison and Joerg Riegel have pointed out, the derivatives provisions now insulate entire markets,
rather than just particular counterparties as before 2005 . !d. at 64 1 , 652. See also Rhett G. Campbell, Financial
Markets Contracts and BAPCPA , 7 9 AM . BANKR. L.J. 697 (2005) (outlining the 2005 changes).
1 27. Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R . Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special
Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 9 1 , 94 (200 5 ).
1 2 8. For an analysis of this risk that now looks prescient, given the Lehman and AIG crises, see Robert R.
Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Derivatives and SystemiC Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout, 2 J. FIN. STAB.
55, 67--68 (2006). As Bliss and Kaufman note, the advent of master agreements that provide for cross-product
netting may have magnified the concentration of the derivatives industry, since the ability to net contracts
entered into with a particular counterparty creates an incentive to deal with a single counterparty. By explicitly
protecting these netting agreements, the 2005 bankruptcy changes reinforced the competitive advantage of the
biggest counterparties.
1 2 9 . See, e.g. , Debtor's Motion for an Order Pursuant to Sections 1 05 and 3 65 of the Bankruptcy Code to
Establish Procedures for the Settlement or Assumption and Assignment of Prepetition Derivatives Contracts 4,
In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. et aI., No. 08- 1 3 555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 1 3 , 2008) ("Debtors are party
to approximately 9 3 0,000 Derivative Contract transactions of which approximately 7 33 ,000 are purported to
have been terminated.").
1 3 0. After establishing a protocol and netting out many of the contracts, ISDA and the derivatives industry
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were collateralized could terminate their contract and use the collateral to satisfy
Lehman 's obligations. Counterparties that did not have collateral, on the other hand,
could close out the contract but they could not take further steps to collect what they were
owed. !3 ! If the counterparties had been able not only to close out their contracts, but also
to insist on immediate payment, Lehman would have been forced to liquidate many of its
assets, which would have seriously complicated the orderly resolution of the case .
From the perspective of Lehman' s counterparties, who were forced to stand in line
with other unsecured creditors, the uncertainty about the status of their claim could have
made it difficult to re-hedge their risk. But this was not an insurmountable problem in
most cases. The counterparty could use the standard procedure for establishing its
damages, which generally involves determining the cost of an alternative transaction. ! 3 2
The counterparty could then purchase the alternative hedge. The principal cost is
uncertainty as to when and how much the counterp arty will be paid in the debtor' s
bankruptcy case. If the contract is unusually large, the cost of re-hedging could b e
prohibitive. But for other contracts, the delay i n recovering i s less problematic (and is no
different than of other creditors in a bankruptcy case).
The current framework-in which counterparties can terminate their contract but are
vulnerable if they do not have collateral-gives counterparties a strong incentive to
assure that they are fully collateralized. The pressure to grab collateral was a central
feature of the AIG collapse. When AIG ' s fortunes deteriorated, its counterparties forced
the insurer to begin posting collateral . To continue satisfying these demands, the
company would have been forced to liquidate assets to generate collateral, perhaps
destroying going concern value in the process. 1 33 The risk of value destruction is
magnified by the potential consequence of the bankruptcy filing itself. Because it is an
event of default under existing derivatives contracts, bankruptcy effectively terminates all
of the debtor's contracts at the same time. 1 34 To avoid this massive termination event, a
company ' s managers can be expected to take extraordinary steps to avoid bankruptcy.
The powerful bankruptcy avoidance incentive makes it even more likely that managers
will destroy going concern value as they liquidate assets to post sufficient collateral to
avoid bankruptcy.

claimed credit for reducing the confusion. See, e.g. , Press Release, International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, ISDA Applauds $25 Trillion Reductions in CDS Notionals, Industry Efforts to Improve CDS
Operations (Oct. 3 1 , 2008), available at http://www. isda.orgipress/press l 03 1 08 .html.
1 3 l . See, e.g. , INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATTVES ASSOCIATION, BANKRUPTCY CODE SAFE
HARBOR OVERVIEW 2 (Jan. 20 I0) ("It is important to note that the solvent party's unsecured claim . . . will be
treated the same as other, non-swap unsecured claims and will be paid only at the same time as other, non-swap
unsecured claims as determined by a bankruptcy court.").
1 32. See, e.g. , LEHMAN BROTHERS GUIDE TO EXOTIC CREDIT DERIVATIVES 4-6 (2005), available at
http ://www.investingbonds.comlassets/files/LehmanExoticCredDerivs. pdf (describing the settlement options).
1 33 . Ordinarily, if a debtor posted new collateral within three months of bankruptcy, this value could be
retrieved from the counterparty as a preferential transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006). But this is one of the
provisions that has been waived for derivatives counterparties. See, e.g. , § 546(e) (protecting margin
arrangements).
1 3 4. See, e.g. , Jean S. Chin, Joseph P. Collins, Pamela 1. Sackmann & Andres E. Aguila, The 2002 ISDA
http ://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+2002+ISDA+Master+Agreement.-a097426052
Agreement,
Master
(describing tightening of bankruptcy default provision in standard agreement) (last visited Mar. 1 0, 20 1 0).

[Vol.

The Journal of Corporation Law

496

3 5:3

Lawmakers could address these concerns in a variety of ways. Most sweepingly,
they could simply reverse the special protections altogether. Applying bankruptcy's
automatic stay and avoidance provisions to derivatives contracts would diminish the
danger of a run on a maj or derivatives counterparty. This benefit would come at the cost
of slowing the resolution of derivatives contracts in cases that did not threaten to shake
the markets to the same extent. A more nuanced response might be to invalidate the
provisions in derivatives contracts that make bankruptcy an event of default, as is done
with most other contracts, so that the bankruptcy filing itself would have less dramatic
consequences. 1 3 5 Lawmakers might also distinguish among different kinds of derivatives
contracts. The case for imposing a stay on termination of credit default swap s, for
instance, is stronger than the case for halting termination of an interest rate or currency
swap . 1 3 6
Overall, however, w e favor the

simplest solution-a b lanket reversal o f the

exemption of derivatives and other financial contracts from the automatic stay. In
addition to curbing the systemic problems we have described by enabling a debtor to halt
asset

grabs by

filing

for

bankruptcy,

the

prospect

of a

stay would

strengthen

counterparties ' incentives both to carefully monitor the debtor, and to avoid overexposing
themselves to a single counterparty. Moreover, the costs of the stay, such as costs due to
the uncertainty whether the debtor will assume or rej ect a contract, could be reduced by
setting tight deadlines on the debtor's decision whether to retain the contract. 1 3 7
The current framework i s far from perfect. Given the systemic concerns outlined in
this Part and the last, rescue loans may sometimes be defensible as an alternative to
bankruptcy. But in most cases, either a traditional bankruptcy filing or a bankruptcy filing
backed by government financing or a government guarantee of vulnerable assets wil l be a
superior mechanism for resolving financial distre ss.
VIII. NEW RULES FOR S YSTEMICALLY I MPORTANT F IRMS ?
With the initial wave of financial institution failures and bailouts now behind us, the
locus of debate over the government ' s bailout policy has shifted to the legislative sphere.
The principal reform proposals would extend bank regulators ' resolution authority to
include systemically important nonbank financial institutions such as investment banks
and insurance holding companies. 1 3 8 In the discussion that follows, we briefly describe

1 3 5 . See 1 1 U.S .C. §§ 5 4 1 (c)( I )(B), 365(b)(2) (over-riding such provisions). For an argument along these
lines, see Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 4.
1 3 6. As proponents of the 1 990 amendments that extended special treatment to swaps frequently pointed
out, the interest rate protection provided by an interest rate swap will generally not be essential to a bankruptcy
debtor, because debtors are not required to make interest payments during the bankruptcy case. See, e.g. , 1989
Swap Hearing, supra note 1 24, at 70 (statement of John J. Jerome) ("The need for interest rate protection is a
fiction because you don't pay, for the most part, postpetition interest."). Credit default swaps, by contrast, are
more likely to play an important role.
1 3 7 . Many derivatives could not be assumed by the debtor in any event. Under I I U.S.C. § 365(c), a debtor
cannot assume contracts such as repos that are designed to provide fmancing.
1 3 8 . The administration released a lengthy white paper outlining its financial reform proposals in June
2009 . TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 1 1 . The resolution proposal discussed in this part can be found at
76-79. As of this writing, a version of this proposal introduced by Congressman Frank has been passed by the
House. See Frank Bill, supra note 1 1 .
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and assess the new proposals.
Under current law, bank and insurance regulators resolve the financial distress of
banks and insurance companies, the FDIC does so for commercial banks and thrifts, and
state insurance regulators do so for insurance companie s. 1 3 9 The holding company of a
bank or insurance company, on the other hand, is subj ect to the ordinary bankruptcy laws,
as are investment banks, hedge funds, and other entities. 1 4 0 The proposed reforms would
shift these boundaries, giving bank regulators resolution authority over any financial

institution holding company deemed "systemically important." 1 4 1 If the Fed, Treasury, or
FDIC designated an institution such as Citigroup or Bank of America as systemically
important, it would be subj ect to the new resolution regime. 1 4 2 In the event of financial
distress, the Treasury, in consultation with the President and after two-thirds approval of
the Federal Reserve and the FDIC board, would designate a regulator-usually the FDIC
according to the government ' s White Paper-to step in as conservator or receiver. 1 4 3
Much like the FDIC with commercial banks, the regulator would have sweeping
authority to rehabilitate, sell, or liquidate the bank, and to determine the payouts to its

creditors and shareho lders. 1 44

The proposal is billed as filling in the gaps in regulatory authority that undermined

the government ' s response to the Bear Steams, Lehman Brothers, and AIG failures. 1 4 5

When these entities ran into trouble, according to former Treasury Secretary Paulson and
other Treasury officials, regulators had only the carrot of bailout money at their disposal;
they did not have any sticks. In particular, they did not have the power to intervene and to
force the institutions to wind down. "In the absence of [a statutory framework for
avoiding the disorderly failure of nonbank financial firms] ," as the White Paper puts it,
"the government's only avenue to avoid the disorderly failures of Bear Steams and AIG
was the use of the Federal Reserve ' s lending authority." 1 46 The new resolution authority
would give them the tools they lacked.
In theory, the expanded resolution authority might enable regulators to intervene
early in a crisis, but there is reason to be skeptical. When systemically important banks
have stumbled, bank regulators have invariably bailed them out rather than letting
creditors take losses and risking a contagion effect. Regulators bailed out Continental

1 39 . See Skeel, supra note 1 2 1 , at 727-33 (describing the bank and insurance insolvency frameworks).
1 40. See, e.g., I I U.S.c. § 1 09(b) (excluding insurance companies, banks, and savings and loans from
bankruptcy, but not excluding their holding companies or other financial institutions). The brokerage operations
of an investment bank can file for Chapter 7 but not Chapter 1 1 . § 1 09(d) (excluding "stockbroker" and
"commodity broker" from Chapter 1 1 ) .
1 4 1 . TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 1 1 , at 74.
1 42. !d. at 75. If the largest subsidiary is a broker-dealer or securities firm, the SEC would take the FDIC 's
place as the final regulatory decision maker and presumptive conservator or receiver. Id.
1 4 3 . !d. Other pending proposals would provide somewhat different rules for intervention, but each
contemplates a similar expansion of bank regulators' authority. See, e.g., Frank Bill, supra note 1 1
(summarizing the bill as giving the Treasury authority to "appoint the FDIC as receiver for one year to resolve,
liquidate, or take other specified emergency stabilization actions with respect to a financial company whose
imminent or actual default would have serious adverse effects on financial stab ility").
1 44 . TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 1 1 , at 75 ; Frank Bill, supra note 1 1 .
1 4 5 . TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 1 1 , at 74 ("The federal government's responses .
were
complicated by the lack of a statutory framework for avoiding the disorderly failure of nonbank financial
firms").
1 46. !d.

The Journal of Corporation Law

498

[Vol.

35:3

Illinois in 1 984, for instance, and provided open bank assistance to Citigroup and Bank o f
America more recently. 1 47 I f the decision making structure were to give the President
and multiple regulators a say, as in the original administration proposal, 1 48 it would
reinforce these proclivities by putting the bailout decision in the hands of a consortium of
politically sensitive decision makers. Anticipating this protection, investors will provide
credit to systemically important institutions more readily, and at lower cost, than with
their non-systemically-important peers, j ust as they did with Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac in the 1 990s and 2000s. 1 4 9 In addition to institutionalizing the recent bailout policy,
the expanded resolution regime would thus spur the continued creation of institutions that
are too big and interconnected to fail.
IX. CONCLUSION
If one mentions b ankruptcy as a mechanism for addressing a financial institution ' s
default, the usual reaction i s incredulity. Those who favor the rescue o f troubled financial
institutions, and even those who prefer that their assets be promptly sold to a healthier
institution, treat b ankruptcy as anathema. Everyone seems to agree that nothing good can
come from bankruptcy.
In this Article, we have tried to complicate that assumption. We do not wish to go to
the opposite extreme and suggest that bankruptcy is always and everywhere the optimal
solution to financial institution distress. But bankruptcy has been surprisingly effective in
most cases, and it avoids many of the distortions and taxpayer commitments required
from the standard, more popular strategy of last-minute rescue lending. With a handful o f
simple changes, i t also could be adjusted t o better handle the financial distress o f
systemically important firms.

147. For a succinct history of these and other bank bailouts, see MCKINLEY & GEGENHEIMER, supra note
12 1, at I, 5-6 (discussing Continental Illinois), 1 9-2 1 (discussing Citigroup and Bank of America).
1 4 8. See supra note 1 43 and accompanying text.
1 49 . See, e.g. , Peter 1. Wallison, Too Big to Fail, or Succeed, WALL ST. J., June 1 8 , 200 9 , at A 1 3 (arguing
that "the administration's plan would create what are essentially government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac in every sector of the financial economy").

